NewMajority.com
A wise man once told me that when it came time for negotiations with America’s enemies, one could not always be categorically for or against such negotiations. The real question is what would America get out of those negotiations? No deal is perfect, and ultimately any decision to negotiate with an avowed enemy comes at a price (the Mankiw disciple in me cries out “Everything is a market decision!”). In the instance of Libya, the Bush administration decided that negotiating with Gaddafi would be worth it, and that applying hard pressure (Libya’s witnessing of a credible U.S. use of force in Iraq) could conspire with softer language to re-orient Tripoli somewhat. The result was Libya abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Agreeing to negotiate directly with Iran comes at a fairly high price. It’s a prestige issue for the United States, since it reverses forty years of precedent against direct dickering with the militant mullahs. It also, by virtue of casting legitimacy upon the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime, softens the credibility of America’s four decade stand in favor of a more liberal Iranian state and the reformers who fight for that dream.
Verily, it says that we are willing to work with, even condone, the status quo. This legitimizes Ahmadinejad’s apocalyptic rhetoric and the Supreme Leader’s ramping up of support for terrorism by increasing the threshold of dangerous and evil activities America will tolerate from another government. Now, this does not automatically mean negotiations should not happen. It simply reminds us of what the United States would put on the table…if it were to sit at the table. The Bush Administration judged that if it could receive a significant guarantee that Iran’s nuclear program would be halted, negotiations could commence. Considering that Iran has essentially acted in an undeclared state of war against American interests in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and Afghanistan during the past decade; this was a very generous offer. President Obama sought to sweeten the deal even more, emphasizing his willingness to negotiate before his reticence over Iran’s WMD program and ties to terrorist groups.
The President’s offer to extend a hand to the mullahs was answered by nine months of spinning centrifuges, human rights disasters, a likely fraudulent election, and more Iranian meddling in Afghanistan, where Tehran has allied with the Taliban, of all people. (Readers will remember Iran and Afghanistan nearly went to war in 1998 over the treatment of Shi’ites under Taliban rule, these days anti-Americanism trumps that.) In response, the Obama Administration indicated that they needed to see credible results by the end of September before they would consider revising their current “wait and see” policy vis-a-vis Iran. The Iranians then sent us an insult of an offer, five pages that discussed all sorts of issues, but nothing about Iran’s nuclear weapons program. President Ahmadinejad declared the nuclear issue “closed.” Instead of responding with appropriate ire, the Administration accepted the Iranian offer, and suggested that once in the room with the Iranians, the U.S. will bring up the nuclear weapons issue. (This brings up a legitimate question: does the State Department really believe our interests will be served by hijacking a conference about other issues and start talking about Iran’s one ‘off-the-table’ precondition for talks? Won’t the Iranians just storm out and call us lying imperialists?). Given the lack of good faith from Tehran, why is America taking this risk? (Read more...)
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